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No profile of events can capture all the
facts, the chaos, and the many thousands
of pages devoted to what the Gulf of
Mexico oil blowout was—and was not.
During several visits to the Gulf region
in 2010 and in the months I spent writing
a book on the subject, the best way I found
to make sense of the blowout’s many facets
was as conceptual topography, its contours
shaped by the interlaced factual and
emotional features of the event. Percep-
tions were important drivers of the effects
of the event. Economic effects largely
reflected perceptions by tourists and sea-
food consumers, and psychological effects
resulted from deep uncertainty over eco-
logical effects and consequently the future
viability of fishing and tourism. It seemed
an event unfolded in three acts: First, the
factors leading up to the blowout. Two,
the varied responses during the blowout
while oil was still streaming from the well.
Third, the post-leak period when assess-
ment, study, and comparison merged the
technological, political, emotional, and
scientific components that comprised the
event [1].
It is tempting to jump from the blowout
to a discussion of America’s energy needs
and the world’s energy future. Those
larger implications can seem to be the
main messages of the blowout. But those
messages exist independent of the blow-
out. That’s why I will resist that connec-
tion until we discuss the blowout itself.
The Blowout Itself
In 2008, the multinational energy
company BP leased a piece of seafloor in
the Gulf of Mexico about 80 km (50 miles)
from Louisiana’s southern shore. The plot
was named Macondo after a fictional town
hewn from a ‘‘paradise of dampness and
silence’’ in Gabriel Garcı ´aM a ´rquez’s
novel One Hundred Years of Solitude.T od o
the drilling, BP hired the global drilling
company Transocean and its drilling rig
Deepwater Horizon. The rig itself was
nearly 122 m (400 ft) tall, its drilling
platform bigger than a football field.
Deep-water drilling is relatively new. In
just the last decade, the number of wells in
water deeper than a mile has gone from
only two dozen to nearly 300. Increasing
complexity increases risks; minimizing chal-
lenges in order to successfully overcome
them creates a tendency to downplay risks.
But as drilling technology advanced rapidly,
accident preparedness and problem-re-
sponse technology—and United States
law—remained stuck in the past, modeled
on an Exxon Valdez–type tanker leak.
Though BP owned the lease, contrac-
tors like Halliburton, which did the
cementing jobs that held the well’s liners
in place, and M-I SWACO, which dealt
with the continually circulated drilling
fluids, did almost all of the work.
The distance from the rig to the sea floor
was just under 1.6 km (1 mi). Sea floor to
the bottom of the well: just over 4 km (about
13,368 ft, or 2.5 mi). A total of 5.6 km
(18,360 ft) from sea surface to well bottom
(.3.5 mi). Humans cannot dive to such
depths, so all the work is done remotely.
Though two-and-a-half miles long, the
well’s top was just 1 meter across, its
bottom merely 172 mm (7 in). As the well
gets dug, engineers line its sides with steel
casing assembled at the surface and sent
down the well. Some sections reach
<600 m (2,000 ft) long. As drilling con-
tinues and the well deepens, narrower
sections are slid through existing sections
and cemented into place. Sitting atop the
well is the failsafe, the blowout preventer,
a 12 m (40 ft) high stack of valves that can
squeeze or cut and seal the drill pipe if
upward-gushing oil and gas threaten to
become uncontrollable.
Various problems had put the job
behind schedule and over budget. In late
April 2010, having discovered a commer-
cially valuable reservoir—drilling rigs are
meant to discover, not extract, oil and
gas—drillers prepared to seal the well and
withdraw, facilitating later extraction of
the petroleum.
Several artificial drilling fluids called
‘‘mud’’ are constantly circulated between
the rig and the bottom of the well and
back. These heavier-than-water fluids
perform several functions, including bring-
ing up rock loosened by the drill bit,
facilitating examination of materials and
hydrocarbons found, and importantly,
keeping a miles-high stack of weight to
counter the upward pressure of any
hydrocarbons coming out of the well walls
in the petroleum-bearing zone. The fluids
are the stopper in the pressurized bottle.
They are expensive; the volume required
in a deep-water well can cost more than
half a million dollars.
The Macondo well’s problems included
loose walls, through which much pressur-
ized drilling fluid escaped. Engineers dealt
with this by mixing a special batch of
viscous fluid designed to seal the porosity
in a way analogous to sealing a leak in a
flat tire with a spray. They had mixed
more than they used, and were faced with
a disposal problem. Bringing the material
back to land for disposal would have
required the expense of transporting it
and handling it as hazardous waste. But
drilling rules allowed them to mix it with
other drilling fluid and send it down the
well. Rig workers sometimes use a differ-
ent fluid to help them mark or separate the
border between two kinds of fluids. When
they see such a ‘‘spacer’’ return to the rig,
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fluids.
On the day of the blowout, the main
tasks were: pump a cement plug hundreds
of feet high into the well to seal the
hydrocarbons in, and recapture the dril-
ling fluid and displace it with much lighter
seawater.
The cements used are not normal
concrete but special mixtures designed to
deal with pressure and the heat inside so
deep a well (above the boiling point of
water). To see whether the cement job
succeeded, the rig team lessened pressure
on the well by displacing some of the
heavy drilling fluid with seawater. Between
the fluid and water they used as a spacer
the viscous fluid they wanted to dispose
of—doing so was highly unusual.
The test of the cement was to reduce
pressure from above, then make certain
that no pressure was building in the well
from below. The test protocol called for a
pressure gauge reading of zero on a
particular pipeline to the rig. And that
line showed zero pressure.
But on a different line, another gauge
was showing pressure building. The gauge
indicating building pressure was correct.
The line showing zero pressure was
clogged with the viscous spacer. The
increasing pressure indicated that the
cement had failed, and that pressurized
oil and gas were entering the well. But rig
workers convinced themselves that the
gauge showing zero pressure was correct
and the other was an anomaly.
Because they intended to discard the
spacer, when they returned it up to the rig
they shunted it overboard, thereby tem-
porarily bypassing other pressure gauges
that could have provided further warning.
When they realized they had a problem,
confusion and issues over authority de-
layed assessment of its severity and caused
hesitation in initiating attempts to activate
the blowout preventer or disconnect the
rig from the mile-long pipe to the seafloor.
They had re-routed the fluid return back
onto the rig when large amounts of
methane reached the surface. Generator
turbines sucked the gas in, causing
ignition.
One worker recognized the need to shut
down the generators but knew he was not
authorized to do so, and consequently did
not. The rig’s chief electrician has asserted
that inhibited audio alarms also inhibited
computer-activated emergency shutdown
of air vents and power.
The subsequent explosions killed 11
people. They also damaged controls to
the blowout preventer and the emergency
disconnect system, rendering them unre-
sponsive. Connected to a nearly infinite
source of fuel, the rig became an inferno.
More than 100 other people escaped in
lifeboats or by leaping into the sea. The rig
burned for two days, then sank on April
22, 2010. The broken pipe at the seafloor
continued spewing oil until, after several
attempts to cap or clog the well, a new cap
succeeded in mid-July.
To review: the cement mixture failed,
highly irregular spacer material clogged a
key pressure gauge, crew members failed
to correctly interpret disparity between
pressure gauges, other gauges were by-
passed or overlooked at critical times,
inhibited alarms may have prevented
automatic shutdown of the ignition source,
and hesitation over authority prevented
manual shutdown that might have averted
ignition of the pressurized hydrocarbons.
A lot of what went wrong involved
matters of judgment. Even the cement
failure appears at least partly linked to
inadequate testing, as well as to formula-
tion and the difficulties caused by depth.
Perhaps the main lesson is: even with
literally billions of dollars and many lives
at stake, incentives to hurry and to show
bravura can seem more important in the
moment.
Unpreparedness
BP had a federally approved Gulf of
Mexico spill response plan that explained
what it would do for walruses and sea
lions—creatures that don’t live in the Gulf
of Mexico. Major sections were merely
cut-and-pasted from Arctic plans. No one
paid attention to them. In a region full of
oil rigs and warehouses full of hardware,
nowhere was there a device for shutting off
a leaking pipe 1 mile deep. All the
response equipment available was similar
to what it had been in the 1970s: booms
adequate to contain small spills inside
harbors, and dispersant chemicals.
Quickly overcome by minor wind and
wave action, the booms did little to
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chemical dispersants were added to the oil
at the surface and at the seafloor. Rea-
sonable people can disagree on whether
dispersants should have been used given
the absence of any real preparation for
stopping a blowout. I was very critical of
dispersants as a response, partly because
they exemplified the lack of real prepara-
tion, their chemical components were
being kept secret, and they served BP’s
interests in hampering understanding of
the amount of oil leaking. Legal liability is
based on how much oil enters the
environment. This gives an oil company
strong incentive to minimize or hide the
amount of oil. Critics used the analogy of
putting the perpetrator in charge of
securing and cleaning up a crime scene.
(BP’s liability assessment will largely be
based on how much oil leaked. BP’s first
estimate of the amount of oil leaking was
1,000 barrels/d, one-sixtieth the
amount—roughly 60,000 barrels/d—later
determined and used by the US Coast
Guard [1 barrel=42 US gallons, <160 li-
ters]. In December 2010, BP announced it
would contest the official and academic
estimates of the total amount of oil.).
Although minor blowouts are not un-
common, and more serious ones occur
periodically, plans for responding to a
blowout were essentially nonexistent. Dril-
ling technology had improved radically,
but response technology and preparedness
had not changed in decades. The various
caps that were tried and failed to stop the
2010 blowout were similar to those that
failed in 1979 to stop the Ixtoc blowout,
which leaked 140 million gallons of oil into
the Gulf of Mexico over 9 months. The
device that eventually stopped the Ma-
condo blowout was designed and built
specifically for that purpose; critics likened
it to responding to a burning building by
designing and building a fire truck.
US oil spill response law, enacted in
1990 to prevent another Exxon Valdez–like
tanker surface spill, was likewise unpre-
pared for a blowout in deep water. The
law required the spiller to conduct the
cleanup, often putting the Coast Guard in
a position of seeming to serve rather than
direct the response. This situation also let
BP inject money into expensive projects
that politicians wanted, but that experts
criticized as ineffective, ecologically dam-
aging, and a waste of money. I witnessed
wetlands being destroyed in Dauphin
Island, Alabama, to harden shorelines
and dig sand for miles of berms that
looked like they would wash away in the
first substantial wind.
How Bad Is It?
Mid-summer assurances by some feder-
al officials that the oil was ‘‘gone’’ [2]
angered regional residents and cost federal
agencies the public’s trust. Some residents,
business owners, fishing interests, environ-
mentalists, and media fueled panicky
predictions of permanent ruination of
beaches and fisheries, crop failures from
oil lifted by hurricane winds and swept
inland, and even—in one widely circulat-
ed email—nothing less than death of the
entire planet from a massive methane
release that the blowout would trigger.
Nor were scientists blameless in making
overstated claims. Some scientists predict-
ed scenarios that were very unlikely, such
as thick oil blanketing the East Coast after
getting entrained in the Loop Current and
Gulf Stream.
The Exxon Valdez was most people’s
mental picture of likely damage. In that case
several factors, including the enormous
numbers of birds and mammals killed and
Exxon’s callous response to the local com-
munity, had indeed added up to a catastro-
phe causing serious long-term ecological,
economic, and psychological damage.
Widespread predictions notwithstand-
ing, the long-term effects will not be
known until the long term. How long,
where, and with what effect oil will remain
in marsh and seafloor sediments also
remains to be seen. The effects of oil on
plankton, larval fish, many invertebrates,
food webs, and other ecological interac-
tions are largely unknown, and may never
be known [3].
Oilhasbeenfoundontheseabedinsome
areas and appears to have killed some
benthic infauna and deep sea corals [4–7].
Hundreds of birds were brought to rehab
facilities, indicating likely uncollected mor-
talities in the low thousands. (Exxon Valdez,
though it spilled far less oil, killed an
estimated quarter million birds and thou-
sands of otters and seals. The physical
configuration of that spill and semi-enclosed
nature of Prince William Sound, the
viscosity of the crude, the cold, and the
presence of different families, orders, and
densities of birds and mammals contributed
to that difference [1].) Effects on fish await
further monitoring, but fishing bans greatly
reduced fishing mortality, and when areas
closed because of oil were reopened, fishing
was reportedly excellent. Oil appeared to
kill some adult dolphins, but there seem to
be no well-documented mass kills. I saw
dolphins swimming in moderate oil; per-
haps many evaded heavy oil. The cause of
recent elevated mortality of newborn dol-
phins—not unprecedented—remains to be
evaluated. The critically endangered
Kemp’s ridley turtle was likely the Gulf
species most vulnerable to extensive surface
oil. Whether their recovery has suffered a
measurable setback remains to be seen.
Migrations put many sea turtles in the open
Atlantic during the summer, away from the
oil.About500 turtles werefound debilitated
or dead during the blowout, but a signifi-
cant number showed no obvious signsofoil,
suggesting that other causes—possibly in-
cluding the nets of shrimp fishers hurrying
to maximize landings prior to inevitable
shut-downs—may have contributed. Some
70,000 turtle eggs were transplanted to
Florida’s east coast, which may boost those
nesting populations, but will cost Gulf turtle
populations the great majority of this year’s
cohort. Understanding the effects on adult
turtle numbers will have to wait years, as
future breeding seasons inform researchers
of the effects of this year’s mortality on
adults and future maturing juveniles (sea
turtles take roughly 12 to 20 years to
mature, and do not breed annually).
Relative Harms
Many people, including the President of
the United States, said that the 2010
Deepwater Horizon disaster—which was
the largest unintended release of petro-
leum ever—constituted ‘‘the worst envi-
ronmental catastrophe in American histo-
ry.’’ (Some simply said ‘‘in history.’’)
But ‘‘worst’’ compared to what? The
blowout’s main effects already seem tem-
porary compared to the clear-cutting of
most of the Pacific Northwest’s forests,
conversion of prairies, disappearance of
once-vast populations of wildlife including
the now-extinct passenger pigeon and
Eskimo curlew, near-extermination of vast
herds of bison, deep depletion of formerly
teeming fishes like Atlantic cod and bluefin
tuna, and so many other long-term
alterations of abundance and distribution.
The most recent academic expert opinion
predicts most commercially exploited Gulf
marine resources except Louisiana oysters
(many of which were killed by freshwater
diverted in an attempt to push oil away
from the coast) will return to pre-blowout
abundances this year [3].
On a global scale, the blowout appears
small and fleeting in comparison to
deforestation, accelerating species loss,
freshwater depletion, fisheries collapses,
human population expansion, polar melt-
ing, coral bleaching, and changes to the
planet’s heat balance and the seas’
chemistry.
Beyond the US, spilled oil routinely
causes worse problems for nature and
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Nigerians could scarcely believe the efforts
exerted to stop the Gulf oil leak and to
protect the Gulf shoreline, because an
amount of oil roughly equivalent to the
Exxon Valdez spills into the Niger Delta
every year [8]. Such spills have destroyed
farms and forests, contaminated drinking
water, driven people from their homes,
and ruined the nets and traps of fishing
people. In the first week of May 2010, a
ruptured ExxonMobil pipeline spilled
more than a million gallons into the Niger
Delta over seven days. Oil companies
claim these leaks are caused by vandals.
Many Nigerians blame rusting facilities,
and believe that oil companies simply
don’t care. A member of Nigeria’s parlia-
ment commented, ‘‘Oil companies do not
value our life; they want us to all die.’’ The
Nigerian government estimated that more
than 200 spills per year occurred annually
between 1970 and 2000.
In 2009, poor safety procedures and
avoidable human error on the Thai-
owned West Atlas drilling rig caused a
blowout in the Montara field in Australian
waters. It leaked an estimated 30,000
barrels of oil that drifted over
90,000 km
2 to Indonesian waters over 74
days before a relief well plugged it. The
Australian government’s report said the
rig was ‘‘an accident waiting to happen;
the company’s systems and processes were
so deficient and its key personnel so
lacking in basic competence, that the
blowout can properly be said to have been
an event waiting to occur. Indeed…the
Inquiry discovered that not one of the five
Montara wells currently complies with the
company’s Well Construction Standards’’
[9]. Indonesia demanded US$2.4 billion
in compensation, which the oil company
rejected [10].
Mounting Crises
At a Washington, D.C., hearing in the
spring of 2010, a US congressman wept
because he could not bear the thought that
the oil might destroy the wetlands of the
Mississippi Delta. For much of the sum-
mer, that fear was widely shared.
But the Associated Press calculated that,
along the Louisiana coastline and roughly
18,000 km
2 (7,000 mi
2) of marsh, only
9k m
2 (3.4 mi
2) of marshland got oiled.
Some of that vegetation was already re-
growing by late summer.
Yet while oil touched the fringes, water
diversions, flood control, and 16,000 km
(10,000 mi) of channels cut into the
Mississippi River Delta have done—and
continue doing—real and permanent
damage.
The great Delta of the Mississippi once
spanned roughly 22,000 to 25,000 km
2
(8,500 to 10,000 mi
2). About 20 percent of
that area, or very roughly 5,000 km
2
(1,800 mi
2) of marsh, has vanished. Re-
cent loss rates have been estimated around
100 to 200 km
2 (20 to 40 mi
2) a year. All
these estimates vary, as do the reasons.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita dissolved
over 200 square miles of marsh to open
water, but that is because much of that
marsh had already been degraded.
The Mississippi River is the main source
of sediment that is the Delta’s nourish-
ment, but engineering projects have al-
most completely isolated the river from its
delta. Because of levees built to control
floods, and the thousands of miles of
channels sliced through the marshes for
shipping and for vessels servicing the oil
rigs, sediment that might build the marsh
goes straight out to the open Gulf. Oil and
gas pumping have also helped the marshes
subside. Sea level rise adds to the problem.
The marshes are a major reason that the
Gulf produces more seafood than else-
where in the lower 48 states. But expect
continued loss of marshes and wet cypress
forest, affecting wildlife, recreation, and
fisheries productivity: some estimates pre-
dict the marshes will largely vanish by
2050 [11,12]. These problems existed
before the 2010 blowout, and continue
afterwards. They have destroyed more
marsh than the 2010 blowout, and they
continue to drive the region’s worst
environmental calamity.
Was the largest accidental release of
petroleum in history really even the worst
‘‘spill’’? In the blowout, surface oil affected
roughly 5 percent of the entire Gulf [3].
Approximately 200 million Macondo gal-
lons hemorrhaged into the Gulf’s 660
quadrillion gallons of water. That volume
of water would dilute the oil, and the
Gulf’s microbes would begin metabolizing
it. But the carbon dioxide we’re spilling
into the atmosphere isn’t getting diluted;
it’s becoming more concentrated. The
greatest environmental catastrophe is not
the oil we spill. It’s the oil and coal we
burn in our engines, whose resulting
carbon dioxide is altering the heat balance
of the planet and the acidity of the seas. It
is melting polar systems, dissolving shell-
fish, killing coral reefs, and changing the
abundance and distribution of organisms
in many systems worldwide. Combustion,
not leakage, is the real disaster. And even
combustion would be far less a problem if
not for the sheer force of our overwhelm-
ing numbers.
Lessons and Implications
One lesson from the events that caused
the blowout is that human judgment is too
frail and self-filtered to prevent all future
accidents associated with deep drilling.
Because deep-water accidents are difficult
to contain, the stakes are increasingly high,
with broad potential effects to natural
assets that support regional economics like
fishing and tourism. Much stronger gov-
ernment oversight could help. Drillers are
turning to deep water because easier, less
expensive, shallower, and land-based res-
ervoirs are being depleted. Increasing the
complexity of the operation will always
increase the risk.
The Obama Administration has re-
versed its plan to expand offshore drilling.
But the oil industry will continue to push
for more drilling in more places. The
country will not simply say no to new
drilling, so we must also say yes to fast-
tracking the scale-up of clean energy
technologies.
We may have dodged a bullet with the
Deepwater Horizon blowout because the
water is warm, the crude is light, the
microbes are hungry, and the walruses are
far to the north. But it was, nonetheless, a
multi-billion-dollar trauma to Gulf coast
communities and businesses.
If the same thing had happened where
walruses really do live—where many
people want to drill, baby, drill—the
damage would be much greater and
longer-lasting, with deeper ecological ef-
fects, and a vastly slower, more difficult
response as a result of the distances
between major human population centers
and ports. And the natural response would
not benefit from the Gulf of Mexico’s
unique ‘‘long term tolerance and adapta-
tion to chronic additions of hydrocarbons’’
conditioned by microbes adapted to the
Gulf’s roughly 1,000 natural petroleum
seeps [3]. The Gulf of Mexico was
arguably the best place in the world for
such a large accidental release of petro-
leum. It likely represents the best case, not
the mean. Next time, we may not be so
‘‘fortunate.’’
In 1969 the Santa Barbara, California,
oil blowout shocked the nation and helped
create the pivotal impetus for the burst of
bipartisan environmental legislation of the
1970s. The main value that might have
come of the Deepwater Horizon blowout
would have been in creating game-chang-
ing momentum toward a new energy path.
But the country’s current political polarity
and a bitterly partisan Congress helped
prevent that from happening. It appears
the moment was lost. Without that
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 4 April 2011 | Volume 9 | Issue 4 | e1001049moment spurring policies encouraging
stepped-up development of new energy
options, the blowout was just a mess with
no redeeming value. Its instructiveness has
not been fully assimilated.
The US needs the new investment,
construction, and infrastructure for phasing
in a diversified cleaner energyfuture. Butas
longasBigOilandBigCoalcontinue toget
market-distorting subsidies, and as long as
elections are undermined by corporate
money, building the needed energy future
will be very difficult for the US to achieve.
The main problems existed before the oil
blowout. And afterward, they remain.
This does not suggest that the risks of
deeper-water drilling are trivial. Brazil’s
president has called its recent deep-water
oil discoveries ‘‘a gift from God.’’ But
Claudio Sampaio of the University of Sa ˜o
Paulo observes, ‘‘We are talking about a
complex and aggressive environment:
there’s salt, there’s corrosion, extreme
pressures, weather can change, waves of
10 m (33 ft) can appear from nowhere…
There’s no engineering solution that could
be 100% safe’’ [13]. Brazil’s Tupi field lies
300 km (<190 miles) offshore, in water
2 km (1.3 mi) deep, under 5 km
(<16,000 ft) of sand, rock, and thick,
rock-hard salt [14]. Indeed, as drilling
goes deeper—especially where oil compa-
nies operate with insufficient oversight and
relative impunity as in the Montara
example—the risks to regional coasts,
marine life, fisheries, reefs, and poor
peoples increases. The 2010 Deepwater
Horizon blowout was yet another warning
that the world’s future energy needs
cannot be met by sources that cause such
large acute and chronic problems and are
getting more difficult and more compli-
cated to extract.
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